Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Companies by Zhang, Hui & Kyaw, Khine
Applied Economics and Finance 
Vol. 4, No. 2; March 2017 
ISSN 2332-7294   E-ISSN 2332-7308 




Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:                       







PhD, China Association for Public companies, New Era Building, Xi Cheng District, Beijing, 100034, China 
2
Associate Professor, NTNU Business School, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Klaebuveien 72, 7030, 
Trondheim, Norway 
Correspondence: Khine Kyaw, Associate Professor, NTNU Business School, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, Klaebuveien 72, 7030 Trondheim, Norway. 
 
Received: December 2, 2016      Accepted: December 23, 2016      Available online: December 26, 2016 
doi:10.11114/aef.v4i2.2109         URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/aef.v4i2.2109 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in Chinese companies. We 
hand collected ownership data on 1178 non-financial companies with a total of 5815 firm-years from annual reports. 
Through fixed-effect panel model, this study has the following findings. First, there is a positive relationship between 
firm performance and institutional ownership in Chinese companies. Second, the proportion of tradable shares 
negatively affects firm performance. Third, ownership concentration and state ownership appear to not affect firm 
performance. 
Keywords: state ownership, institutional ownership, tradable shares, firm performance, China 
JEL classifications: G10, G15, G18, G32  
1. Introduction  
One feature of the modern listed companies is the wide-spread ownership structure. Shareholdings of various 
shareholders generate the conflicts of interest among shareholders, thereby influencing firm performance of companies. 
Thus, appropriate ownership structure may support companies to have a good performance in market. For instance, 
although concentrated ownership by institutional owners can bring a positive effect on firm performance (Elyasiani and 
Jia, 2010), inappropriate level of ownership concentration can bring negative effects on firm performance (Dahya et al., 
2008). The political shareholding can also have negative impact on firm performance (Chang and Wong, 2004).  
Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies can be characterised by the ownership concentration and the political 
shareholdings. A centrally planned economic regime used to dominate Chinese market for decades. During that period, 
the only legal economic entities in the Chinese market were the state owned companies. The state simultaneously 
worked as the owner and managers in these companies. Then the Chinese government decided to abandon the economic 
regime at the end of 1970s, and since then the government has been trying to move the economy towards a market 
oriented economic regime. During this process, the ownership began to be separated from control. Some state owned 
companies have been sold to private investors. The stock exchanges have been established to allow companies raise 
fund through issuing stocks. Because of those changes, the ownership structure of Chinese companies has become 
diversified.  
However, the ownership of Chinese companies has several drawbacks. One of them is the prevalence of state ownership. 
As the founding shareholder, the proportion of state shareholdings remains high. Studies have shown that state 
ownership can negatively influence firm performance of Chinese companies (see for example Chen et al., 2007). 
Additionally, the stock segmentation harms the liquidity of Chinese market, since most of the available shares are 
non-tradable shares that cannot be trade in the market (Berkman et al., 2009). The stock segmentation prohibits the 
market mechanism from improving Chinese companies’ performance (Huang and Fung, 2005; Tomasic and Fu, 2006).  
At the end of 2005, market regulators started a series of reforms of ownership structure to improve on the weaknesses of 
ownership structure of Chinese companies. One of the reforms is to gradually convert the non-tradable shares into 
tradable shares (Ng et al., 2009). Non-tradability of shares can lead to poor performance in firms as studies have shown 
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that directors’ compensation and related-party transactions are positively correlated with non-tradability of shares (see 
for example Yeh et al., 2009). 
To examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance as firms are being reformed, this study 
employs a sample of 1178 non-financial companies from 2004 to 2008. Through the use of fixed-effect model that 
controls for potential endogeneity in the data, this study uncovers the followings. First, similar to the findings from 
other markets, institutional ownership has positive effects on firm performance in Chinese companies. Second, contrary 
to expectation there is a negative relationship between the proportion of tradable shares and firm performance. This 
could be due to the market being at an early stage of its development. Young financial markets tend to host relatively 
less sophisticated investors (Zhang et al., 2010), a situation which could exacerbate the problem of free-riders. 
Consequently, firm performance impairs as more tradable shares become available. Finally, state ownership and 
ownership concentration do not appear to affect firm performance in Chinese companies. State ownership may divert 
firm objectives to social performance, yet providing better access to the resources the firm needs. This situation may 
have created opposing effects on the firm’s performance which eventually cancel off each other leaving no net effect on 
the firm’s performance. Ownership concentration may reduce the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers, but it may also exacerbate the conflict of interest among shareholders (López-de-Foronda et al., 2007; 
Chen-Lung et al., 2009). This might explain the apparent absence of significant relationship between the ownership 
concentration and firm performance. 
The Chinese market is very well suited for a study on the effects of ownership structure and share tradability as it offers 
a natural experiment. This study contributes to the literature on firm performance in a number of ways. First, this study 
explores the effect tradability of shares has on firm performance when a market is in its early stage of development. 
Secondly, the study investigates the effects of state and institutional ownerships on firm performance while the state 
control is being relinquished gradually. Finally, the study sheds light on the importance of ownership concentration for 
firm performance when the firm is in transition towards a more market-oriented economy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the institutional framework of Chinese market. Section 
3 reviews the relevant studies to develop the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. 
Empirical results are summarized in section 5. The study concludes in section 6.  
2. Institutional Framework 
China used to follow a central planning oriented economic regime. Founders of the peoples’ republic of Chinese 
adopted this economic regime from the former soviet countries. Under this economic regime, the state simultaneously 
worked as owners and managers of Chinese companies. The state companies are the legal business entities in Chinese 
market. However, this economic regime was criticized as the economic development of Chinese market was impaired, 
since Chinese companies were driven by non-commercial reasons (Xu et al., 2005). Thus, the Chinese government 
decided to replace it with a market oriented economic regime (Zhang, 2004).  
The government adopted the separation of ownership and control to reform Chinese companies, and allowed numerous 
shareholders to purchase shares of the state owned companies. Some state owned companies that have poor 
performance were sold to non-state investors. The government also established two stock exchanges in the early 1990s 
to allow companies to issue stocks on these exchanges, thereby raising funds for the future developments.  
The newly privatized companies inherited certain ownership structure from their predecessors. The government retained 
control in many of the newly privatized companies. Moreover, despites some shares being floated on an exchange, 
many remains highly restricted from trading. At the beginning of 2005, shares owned by the government and 
government-related agencies accounted for more than 70 percent of all non-tradable shares which accounted for more 
than half of the shares (Jiang et al., 2010). 
3. Literature and Hypotheses 
3.1 Types of Owner and Firm Performance  
There are two predominant types of owners in post-privatized firms and both are expected to have effects on firm 
performance. 
Under the centrally planned regime, all of the Chinese companies were owned and controlled by the government. The 
government had undeniable influence on decision making of Chinese companies (Li, 2006). In other words, companies 
were lack of managerial discretions, but the ownership structure of Chinese companies was simple during that period.  
However, the old economic regime was found to have negative impact on firm performance in Chinese companies 
(Clarke, 2003). To replace the old economic regime, the government began to reform the ownership structure of 
Chinese companies. Investors were allowed to hold shares of companies. At the same time, the government established 
two stock exchanges to allow companies issue stocks. Thus, the single ownership structure of Chinese companies 
became a diversifiable ownership structure.  
Despite the potential benefits, there are several drawbacks of this reform. The influence of state on Chinese companies 
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is still prevalent widely (Berkman et al., 2010). As a result, managerial decisions of Chinese companies are still oriented 
towards the interests of the government. Since the government has societal goals above the economic goals, we 
hypothesize that:  
H1: there is a negative relationship between the state shareholdings and firm performance. 
In the market economy, the ownership is separated from the control. Companies are managed by the professional 
managerial team. However, the widespread ownership of listed companies causes the collective supervision infeasible 
(Hart, 1995). At the same time, the widespread ownership structure generates the problem of free-riders. Individual and 
small shareholders who either lack interest or the abilities to monitor companies, or both (Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2004). Thus, they prefer to rely on other shareholders to monitor the management.  
Ownership by institutional investors is mainly through portfolio investments. Institutional investors tend to have low 
risk aversion and relatively long investment horizon, yet their performance is usually measured by the financial success 
of their investments. Thus, 
H2: there is a positive relationship between the institutional ownership and firm performance. 
3.2 Share Tradability and Firm Performance 
The transition from the centrally planned regime to a market regime has resulted firms with significant level of 
non-tradable shares in the hands of the state and state-related owners. The stock segmentation prohibits market 
mechanism from influencing Chinese companies. Although Chinese companies are listed in stock exchanges, most of 
stocks could not be exchanged due to non-tradability clause (Chiou and Lin, 2005). Thus, the stock segmentation causes 
the large shareholders to be entrenched in Chinese companies. This exacerbated the conflicts of interests between large 
shareholders and small shareholders, thereby damaging firm performance. At the end of 2005, the market regulators of 
Chinese securities market began to require companies to gradually float the non-tradable shares. This reform is expected 
to solve the problem of stock segmentation, thereby improving firm performance of Chinese companies. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
H3: there is a positive relationship between the tradable shares and firm performance.  
3.3 Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
In the modern listed companies, the ownership is separated from the control. Companies are managed by the 
professional managerial team. However, the widespread ownership of listed companies causes the collective supervision 
infeasible (Hart, 1995). At the same time, the widespread ownership structure generates the problem of free-riders. 
Individual and small shareholders who either lack interest or the abilities to monitor companies, or both (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2004). Thus, they prefer to rely on other shareholders to monitor the management.  
One solution of the problem of free-riders is the concentration of ownership. Through the ownership concentration, the 
shareholders will have enough power to represent the individual and small shareholder in companies, impose sufficient 
supervision pressure on the managerial team to motivate them to increase firm performance, or replace the managerial 
team with poor performance. Thus, the concentrated ownership should positively affect firm performance (Gorton and 
Kahl, 2008; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). 
H4: there is a negative relationship between the ownership concentration and firm performance. 
However, an inappropriate ownership concentration can exacerbate the conflicts of interest between large and small 
shareholders and thereby reducing the firm performance. If shares of listed companies are concentrated in a small group 
of shareholders, these holders will control the firm. In this case, the interest of small shareholders can be easily 
expropriated by large shareholders, thereby exacerbating the conflicts of interests between large shareholders and small 
shareholders. For instance, large shareholders may exacerbate the interest of small shareholders through the related 
party transaction (Dahya et al., 2008). Thus, ownership concentration can damage firm performance in some cases. 
4. Data and Methodology 
We hand-collected ownership data for non-financial companies from the annual reports for the years 2004-2008. Annual 
reports of companies give the proportion of the state shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, proportion of tradable 
shares, and shareholdings of the largest shareholder. After removing incomplete data, the final sample contains 1178 
companies. To measure the firm performance, we employ three proxies for firm performance: (1) return on equity 
(ROE), (2) return on asset (ROA), and (3) the Tobin’s Q (Q). Data of ROE and ROA are directly gathered from the 
annual report. We calculate the Tobin’s Q, as in Hovey et al (2003). The cost of replacement can be measured by the 
total asset, and the market value is equal to share price times the number of ordinary shares (Hovey et al., 2003).  
There are three independent variables. Ownership concentration (con) is measured by the percentage shareholdings by 
the largest shareholder. State ownership (state) is the proportion of shareholdings by the state. Institutional ownership 
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(insti) is the percentage of shareholdings by the institutional shareholder. The proportion of tradable share (tradable) is 
expressed as the proportion of tradable shares in the total shares of a company. 
We include a number of control variables. Meyers (1984) state that the companies prefer to issue debt rather than equity 
to raise fund, and that leverage can influence firm performance. Thus, firm leverage (leverage), calculated as the ratio of 
debt to total equity, is included as a control. Since in emerging market, large firms can easily have a better performance 
than small companies (Rochina-Barrachina et al., 2010), firm size (size) measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s 
book value of assets is also included. At the end of 2005, the Chinese companies began to reform their ownership 
structure. At the same time, the market regulator also promulgated a series of new regulatory roles. To control the 
influence of these events, the reform dummy (reform) that takes on the value one if the firm is before the year 2005 and 
zero otherwise is included as another control.  
Empirical model estimated can be expressed as:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽4 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽7 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 .         (1) 
where it represents individual firm-year. 
Since it could have been that certain ownership structure was attracted by firm performance, Equation (1) is estimated 
using fixed-effect panel model that can control this form of endogeneity. Due to the high concentration of state 
ownership, we estimate Equation (1) with either ownership concentration or state ownership to minimize 
multicollinearity in estimation.  
5. Results 
The sample consists of 5,815 firm-years. Table 1 presents summary statistics on firm performance and ownership 
structure.  
The median state ownership is 36.1%, with the average is 33.6%. This reflects that the state ownership is still a major 
owner type in the ownership structure in Chinese companies. The average of institutional ownership is 5.9%, with the 
median is 2.2%. The average of largest shareholders shareholding is 38.2% in this sample, which implies that shares are 
greatly concentrated in a single shareholder.  
Table 2 shows the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the full sample of this study. As 
predicted, the institutional ownership has positive effect on all proxies of firm performance. There is no statistical 
evidence to support the hypotheses that ownership concentration and state ownership damage firm performance in 
Chinese companies. Tradable shares have statistically significant effect on firm performance, yet the effect is negative, 
rather than positive. Firm size is found to negatively affect ROA and Q in Chinese companies, but there is no 
statistically significant relationship between firm size and ROE. Moreover, the indicator for reform is negatively 
associated with firm performance suggesting that firms in post-reform period have a better performance. Figures from 
table 2 also show that there is a negative relationship between leverage and firm performance.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Ownership concentration 0.382 0.361 0.852 0.008 0.159 5815 
State ownership 0.336 0.361 0.970 0 0.238 5815 
Institutional ownership 0.059 0.022 0.680 0 0.084 5815 
Tradable proportion 0.501 0.477 1 0.025 0.170 5815 
size 15.342 14.404 20.438 3.934 16.852 5815 
Leverage 1.624 1.023 1913.082 -1671.430 35.598 5815 
Note: Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage shareholdings by the largest shareholder. State ownership is the 
percentage shareholding by the state. Institutional ownership is the percentage shareholding by the institutional shareholders. The 
proportion of tradable share, tradable proportion, is expressed as the proportion of tradable shares in the total shares of a company. 
size is the natural logarithm of total asset of companies. Leverage is the debt-to-equity ratio.  
As a robustness check, the whole sample is then divided into two subsamples. The first subsample consists of state 
owned companies, where the largest shareholder is the state. The second subsample consists of non-state owned 
companies. Equation (1) is then re-estimated for each subsample and the results for state and non-state companies are 
represented respectively in Tables 3 and 4. 
Results from table 3 show that institutional ownership remains positive in state-owned companies. In state owned 
companies, there is also a negative relationship between firm performance and proportion of tradable shares. However, 
concentrated ownership does not improve firm performance in state-owned companies. Again, the state owned 
companies have better performance after the market reform. Similar results are observed in Table 4 as well.  
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Table 2. Relationship between characteristics of ownership structure and firm performance in the full sample 
 
Dependent: ROE Dependent: ROA Dependent: Q 
Con 0.288    0.278    0.087    
 (1.407)    (1.052)    (0.750)    
State   0.067    0.240    -0.001  
   (0.447)    (1.197)    (-0.016)  
Insti 0.018 * 0.019 * 0.117 *** 0.118 *** 0.067 *** 0.067 *** 
 (1.742)  (1.809)  (8.642)  (8.723)  (11.070)  (11.088)  
Tradable -0.191 *** -0.214 *** -0.388 *** -0.396 *** -0.294 *** -0.303 *** 
 (-3.113)  (-3.612)  (-4.967)  (-5.219)  (-8.390)  (-8.966)  
size -0.032  -0.029  -0.520 *** -0.517 *** -0.475 *** -0.474 *** 
 
(-0.943)  (-0.845)  (-13.395)  (-13.380)  (-28.913)  (-28.951)  
Leverage -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** 0.000  0.000  
 
(-13.330)  (-13.319)  (-2.792)  (-2.765)  (0.874)  (0.868)  
reform -0.103 *** -0.096 *** -0.300 *** -0.301 *** -0.509 *** -0.506 *** 
 
(-3.341)  (-3.108)  (-7.660)  (-7.708)  (-29.797)  (-29.686)  
Constant 0.405  0.427  4.163 *** 4.146 *** 7.681 *** 7.692 *** 
 
(0.805)  (0.848)  7.233  7.197  31.674  31.707  
Adj. R2 0.92  0.92  0.51  0.51  0.58  0.58  
*, **, and*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Table 3. Ownership structure and firm performance in state-owned companies 
  Dependent: ROE Dependent: ROA Dependent: Q 
Con 0.328    0.480    0.024    
  1.136    1.557    0.165    
State   0.394    0.452    0.087  
    1.355    1.445    0.601  
Insti 0.093  0.094  0.099  0.100  0.071 *** 0.071 *** 
  6.615 *** 6.677 *** 6.543 *** 6.610 *** 10.086  10.105  
Tradable -0.263 *** -0.248 *** -0.314 *** -0.307 *** -0.279 *** -0.271 *** 
  -3.154  -2.894  -3.506  -3.327  -6.523  -6.191  
size -0.060  -0.065  -0.271 *** -0.274 *** -0.316 *** -0.317 *** 
  -1.279  -1.362  -5.375  -5.402  -14.186  -14.192  
Leverage -0.001  -0.001  -0.009  -0.009  0.000  0.000  
  -0.318  -0.317  -1.906  -1.906  1.111  1.116  
reform -0.176 *** -0.180 *** -0.202 *** -0.201 *** -0.439 *** -0.442 *** 
  -4.030  -4.105  -4.308  -4.270  -20.700  -20.839  
Constant -1.836 *** -1.803 *** 0.393 *** 0.436 *** 5.392 *** 5.387 *** 
  -2.590  -2.549  0.521  0.579  16.151  16.162  
 Adj. R2 0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.54  0.54  
*, **, and*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Table 4. Ownership structure and firm performance in private companies 
  Dependent: ROE Dependent: ROA Dependent: Q 
Con -0.556    -0.377    0.408    
  -0.983    -0.650    1.632    
State   1.049 *   0.895    -0.143  
    1.719    1.403    -0.511  
Insti 0.153 *** 0.152 *** 0.161 *** 0.161 *** 0.059 *** 0.061 *** 
  5.654  5.647  5.745  5.761  4.822  4.981  
Tradable -0.483 *** -0.420 *** -0.356 ** -0.313 ** -0.224 *** -0.270 *** 
  -3.143  -2.969  -2.217  -2.106  -3.196  -4.158  
size -0.195 * -0.214 ** -0.975 *** -0.983 ** -0.612 ** -0.602 ** 
  -1.924  -2.141  -13.579  -13.882  -20.137  -20.152  
Leverage 0.020  0.019  -0.012 * -0.012 ** -0.001  -0.001  
  1.548  1.510  -1.987  -2.011  -0.516  -0.492  
reform -0.126  -0.147 * -0.296 *** -0.313 *** -0.536 *** -0.531 *** 
  -1.635  -1.908  -3.845  -4.042  -15.924  -15.678  
Constant 0.439  0.523  10.925 *** 10.907 *** 9.454 *** 9.428 *** 
  0.300  0.358  10.551  10.543  21.975  21.906  
 Adj. R2 0.52  0.52  0.47  0.47  0.65  0.65  
*, **, and*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
The separation of ownership and control is a fundamental characteristic of modern listed companies. Large companies 
have a plenty of shareholders who have various interests. Thus, the ownership structure will affect the extent to which 
the conflict of interest prevails in companies, thereby affecting firm performance. Previous studies indicate that 
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ownership concentration tends to damage firm performance in companies (Dahya et al., 2008). Conversely, institutional 
ownership has positive impacts on firm performance (Gorton and Kahl, 2008; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). 
Using a sample of 5815 firm-years we investigate the effect of ownership structure on firm performance as measured by 
the return on equity, return on asset and Tobin’s Q. As anticipated, institutional ownership improves firm performance. 
However, concentrated ownership and state ownership do not deteriorate firm performance as postulated. Also 
unexpected is the effect of tradable shares on firm performance. The reduction in non-tradable shares is expected to 
positively affect firm performance but the results suggest otherwise.  
State ownership and firm performance 
Results from this study indicate that state ownership does not deteriorate firm performance, even in the state owned 
companies. This might partly be explained by the fact that the firms have relatively recently transited from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy. In centrally planned economy, the state controlled resource allocation for the 
country, which benefited state companies. Even after de-centralization, state involvement has shown to enable firms 
with better access to the resources needed (Li et al., 2008). Thus, the state ownership might have helped firms access 
the resources they need to improve firm performance while their economic performance is deteriorated through 
diversion of resources to societal welfare performance. 
Ownership concentration and firm performance 
Contrary to the previous studies, our results indicate no relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. This could be due to the level of investor protections. Ownership concentration can impose more 
supervision pressure on managerial team and reduce the conflict of interests between shareholders and managerial team. 
However, the ownership concentration can exacerbate the conflicts of interest between large shareholders and small 
shareholders when investor protections are weak. As a consequence, the conflicts of interest between shareholders may 
exacerbate the agency cost, thereby harming firm performance.  
Institutional ownership and firm performance 
We find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. This is consistent with previous 
studies (Gorton and Kahl, 2008; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Instructional ownership has the following potential benefits to 
companies. Firstly, institutional investors have abilities to effectively oversee the managerial team of companies. When 
their shareholdings are large enough, they can impose supervision pressure on managerial team. Thus, institutional 
shareholders motivate executives of companies to increase firm performance. Secondly, institutional shareholding may 
reduce the conflicts of interest between large shareholders and small shareholders. Compare with individual 
shareholders, shareholdings of institutional shareholders are relatively large. Thus, institutional shareholders can 
represent individual shareholders in monitoring the firm (Admati et al., 1994). And institutional investors investing 
through portfolio investments are evaluated on the performance of their investment portfolios. Under this circumstance, 
the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small shareholders might be reduced, thereby, improving firm 
performance.  
Tradable shares and firm performance 
This study finds that an increase in the proportion of tradable shares in the companies has negative effect on firm 
performance. The purpose of the reduction of non-tradable shares is to reduce the negative impact of stock segmentation 
on the companies. Thus, the reduction of non-tradable shares is expected to have positive effect on firm performance. 
However, the empirical results are converse to the expectation. A possible reason for this is the characteristics of 
investors in the securities markets. The majority of Chinese investors are individual and small shareholders (Zhang et al, 
2010). The reduction of non-tradable shares increase liquidity of the Chinese securities markets, since the number of 
shares traded increases. More unsophisticated investors are attracted to join the markets (Zhang et al, 2010). This may 
exacerbate the problem of free-rider, consequently impairing the quality of monitoring of the firms. If shareholders 
cannot effectively monitor executives of companies, there will be serious conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
executive, thereby lowering firm performance.  
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